The Greatest Conceivable Being
A Philosophical Case Against Allah
Below is a research paper that I wrote for my Philosophy of Religion class at Dallas Baptist University over the Greatest Conceivable Being and Allah. I hope you’re able to learn something too!
Introduction
In Seeking Allah, Finding Jesus, Nabeel Qureshi outlines his story as he moved from a devout Muslim who grew up in an Islamic household to a born-again Christian after becoming friends with an evangelistic apologist in college. Although he was once convinced of the truth of Islam and of Allah as the Greatest Conceivable Being, through years of studying the arguments both for and against Christianity, such as the Ontological Argument, he came to faith in Yahweh as the Greatest Conceivable Being, ultimately rejecting his belief in Allah and Islam.1 Just as Qureshi discovered, this paper argues that the philosophical concept of God as the Greatest Conceivable Being, developed by Anselm of Canterbury, gives reason both to reject belief in the God of Islam, Allah, due to his lack of great-making properties, such as that of immanence, and to accept belief in the God of Christianity, Yahweh, who bears all great-making properties, including immanence.
The Greatest Conceivable Being (The GCB)
Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), who was arguably the most significant theologian since Augustine and presided as the archbishop of Canterbury during the eleventh century, first formulated the Ontological Argument.2 In the Ontological Argument, as laid out in the Proslogion (or the Proslogiom), Anselm sought to prove God’s existence in a single argument.3 Ontological arguments, which is an entire category of apologetics, “attempt to show that the very concept or idea of God implies his reality: that is one’s being able to clearly conceive of God somehow implies that God actually exists.”4 While there are several, a version of Anselm’s argument is as follows:5
1) God is the Greatest Conceivable Being
2) God exists at least in the mind
3) A being who exists only within the mind is not as great as one who exists both within the mind and reality
4) If God existed only within the mind, He would not be the Greatest Conceivable Being
5) Therefore, God must exist within reality as well as the mind
Anselm, in his argument, defined God as that being “than which nothing greater can be conceived.”6 To Anselm, God was the Greatest Conceivable Being, or the GCB. As such, Anselm believed that God must exist. If God did not exist, then he could not have possibly been the GCB. This argument was later attacked by Gaunilo, who pushed back Anselm’s argument by claiming the greatest conceivable island must exist according to the same logic, which obviously it does not.7 Immanuel Kant also objected to Anselm’s argument, famously arguing that “existence is not a property (or predicate).”8
While Anselm’s argument, in its original form, has nearly been unanimously agreed upon to be flawed, improved versions of the argument are still used today. Both Descartes and Leibniz defend various versions of the argument, and the twentieth century brought about increased interest in the argument, with philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga further developing versions of the argument.9 What is most helpful from Anselm’s iteration of the argument, however, is his concept of the GCB, which is the aspect this paper will be focusing on. While Anselm’s was seeking to prove Yahweh’s existence, his argument doesn’t actually prove any one god, but just the existence of a god, and many different religions view their own god as being the true manifestation of the GCB. However, most of these gods fail to adequately meet the requirements of being considered the GCB—one of these gods being Allah, the god of Islam.
The GCB and Allah
In Islam, Allah has ninety-nine names. Surah 17:110 of the Quran says, “Say, O Prophet, ‘Call upon Allah or call upon the Most Compassionate—whichever you call, He has the Most Beautiful Names.’”10 Each of these names refers to a specific property that Allah bears, many of which could be considered as what are called great-making properties, or properties possessed by the GCB.11 For example, Surah 42:51 of the Quran says, “It is not possible for a human being to have Allah communicate with them, except through inspiration, or from behind a veil, or by sending a messenger-angel to reveal whatever He wills by His permission. He is surely Most High, All-Wise.”12 Two names of Allah are mentioned here: Most High and All-Wise. Of these, All-Wise is also considered to be a great-making property, namely that of omniscience. Given this name, Allah bears some of the great-making properties required to be the GCB; however, Allah does not bear all of the properties. It is not enough for a god to bear some of the properties; they must bear all of them. Allah may be all-knowing, for instance, but he is not all-loving or all-good (omnibenevolent).
One example of a great-making property that Allah does not bear is immanence, meaning god’s nearness to humanity or his presence in creation.13 In his other book, No God but One, Qureshi argues, “Both Muslims and Christians believe that God is the greatest being in the universe. But if Allah is the greatest, and in his nature he is removed and does not desire a relationship, then Islam exalts the qualities of being removed and non-relational.”14 Out of all ninety-nine of Allah’s names, none of them imply that Allah wants a relationship with humanity, nor are any terms of intimacy.15 More-so, there is nothing throughout the rest of the Quran that implies such.16 Qureshi goes on to say, “Allah intends man to pursue the relationship of a servant to his master, but not the relationship of a child with his father. Nothing in the Quran suggests that Allah desires intimacy with humanity. We are not his beloved—just one of his creatures.”17 Norman L. Geisler Abdul Saleeb back up Qureshi’s claim, affirming, “In the language of the Quran this relationship is described in terms of master and slave…The theme of an intimate relationship between God and man is not further developed either in the Quran or in orthodox Islamic theology.”18 The following argument, shows that Allah does not possess immanence, and is therefore a worse candidate for the GCB:
1) If Allah is the GCB, then he bears all great-making properties
2) If Allah bears all great-making properties, then he bears the property of immanence
3) If Allah is the GCB, then he bears the property of immanence
4) Allah does not bear the property of immanence
5) Allah is not the GCB
Or, as represented in truth-functional logic:
1) A⊃B
2) B⊃C
3) A⊃C (HS 1, 2)
4) ~C
5) ∴ ~ A (MT 3, 4)
This argument, which is a combination of a hypothetical syllogism and a modus tollens argument, is a valid argument, meaning that if the premises are true, then the conclusion follows. In order to show this argument is both valid and sound, the premises must be demonstrated as true, namely, that immanence is in fact a great-making property. As such, it is better for a god to be near and draw close to humanity rather than to be distant and pull away from humanity; therefore, for a god to be the GCB, they must be near and draw close to humanity. Immanence, then, is considered to be a great-making property. Given that Allah does not meet this standard to be the GCB and does not bear the great-making property of immanence (And therefore neither that of omnibenevolence), he cannot be the GCB; the GCB must be a god that bears the property of immanence. Since Allah is not immanent, he is also unknowable. Geisler and Saleeb continue, “Since everything is based in God’s will and since his effects are sometimes contradictory and do not reflect any absolute essence, God’s nature is really unknowable… The relationship between [God] and his creatures is extrinsic, not intrinsic.”19 Allah is not immanent, and therefore he is unknowable. This further supports the belief that Allah cannot be the GCB, as it is better be known rather than unknown.
The GCB and Yahweh
In many ways, Allah and Yahweh are very similar. For example, they both share the properties of omnipotence, meaning they are both all-powerful, and omniscience, meaning they are both all-knowing. However, unlike Allah, Yahweh does possess the property of immanence. Going back to the aforementioned quote of Qureshi’s, “Both Muslims and Christians believe that God is the greatest being in the universe… On the other hand, if Yahweh is the greatest being, and intrinsic to his nature are intimacy and love, then Christianity exalts relationships and community.”20 The following argument, similar to the previous argument, shows that Yahweh does possess immanence, and is therefore a better candidate for the GCB:
1) If Yahweh bears the property of immanence, then he bears all great-making properties
2) If Yahweh bears all great-making properties, then he is the GCB
3) If Yahweh bears the property of immanence, then he is the GCB
4) Yahweh does bear the property of immanence
5) Yahweh is the GCB
Or, as represented in truth-functional logic:
1) A⊃B
2) B⊃C
3) A⊃C (HS 1,2)
4) A
5) ∴ C (MP 3,4)
This argument, which is a combination of a hypothetical syllogism and modus ponens, is also valid, which, once again, means that if the premises are true, then the conclusion follows from the premises. If Yahweh bears other great-making properties such as omnipotence and omniscience, or the omnis, in addition to immanence, then he already bears more great-making properties than Allah, and it is more likely that he does possess all great-making properties, meaning premise one is likely true. Premise two has already been established as necessarily true, and premise three follows from premise one and two through the logic rule of hypothetical syllogism. What’s left is to establish whether Yahweh does in fact possess immanence. Yahweh, by nature, is relational. After all, the Trinity is one being comprised of three persons in relation with one another.21 Further, humans, because they are made in the image of God, are made to be relational, both with one another and with Yahweh. Yahweh, who is relational, made humans to be relational that they may have a relationship with him as well as with one another.22 As the Westminster Catechism famously says, “Man’s chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever.”23 In other words, man’s purpose is to know Yahweh. Yahweh, unlike Allah, desires a relationship with humanity, meaning he is immanent. While Allah is called ‘master,’ Yahweh is called ‘Father,’ or ‘Abba,’ a “term of endearment for a loving parent.”24 Qureshi goes on to say, “Since God is the greatest being, relational and loving, relationships and love are the most important commandments for mankind.”25 It is clear that in addition to the omnis, Yahweh is also immanent, and as such, he is a better candidate for the GCB than Allah.
Conclusion
Two brothers, Ergun and Emir Caner, in their book, Unveiling Islam, commentate, “When Allah is discussed within the Islam community, the absence of intimacy, atonement, and omnibenevolence becomes apparent… Allah is a distant sovereign.”26 However, they contrast the Islamic view of Islam with the Christian view of God, asserting, “In Christianity… each of us is a temple of the Holy Spirit, suggesting immanence in the life of the believer… Yahweh is a caring, loving, and intimately involved Father.”27 Yahweh, in his immanence, came to earth in human form to live among his creation. In his gospel, the apostle John writes, “the Word became flesh and dwelt among us,”28 and in his letter to the Philippians, Paul writes “[He] emptied himself, by taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being found in human form, he humbled himself by becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross.”29 Not only does he live among humanity, but he dies for humanity, and upon rising from the dead, he fills those who follow him with his own Spirit. A god cannot get any more immanent than dwelling inside his followers. In this way, Yahweh demonstrates his immanence, and in comparison, Allah completely falls short. Allah never lived among his creation, and he certainly never put his spirit into them.
The philosophical concept of God as the Greatest Conceivable Being gives great reason to accept Yahweh as a candidate, as he bears all great-making properties, including immanence, and to reject Allah as a candidate, as he lacks many great-making properties, such as that of immanence. Returning to the words of Anselm, “So truly dost Thou exist, O Lord God, that it is not possible to conceive of Thee as not existing. For, if any mind could conceive of anything better than Thou art, then the creature would ascend above his Creator and become His judge, which is supremely absurd. Everything else besides Thyself can be conceived of as not existing.”30 If Allah is in fact not the GCB, then he cannot possibly exist; if Yahweh is in fact the GCB, then he must necessarily exist.
Nabeel Qureshi, Seeking Allah, Finding Jesus: A Devout Muslim Encounters Christianity (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2018).
Philip Schaff and David S. Schaff, History of the Christian Church, vol. 5 (1907; repr., Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 598.
Ibid., 601-602.
C. Stephen Evans and R. Zachary Manis, Philosophy of Religion: Thinking about Faith (Downers Grove, Illinois: Ivp Academic, 2009), 63.
Ibid., 63-64.
Nigel Warburton, A Little History of Philosophy (New Haven, Connecticut; London: Yale University Press, 2012), 46.
Ibid., 48.
Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 64.
Ibid., 63.
Mustafa Khattab, The Clear Quran: A Thematic English Translation of the Message of the Final Revelation (Lombard, Illinois: Book of Signs Foundation, 2016), 17:110.
Nabeel Qureshi, No God but One: Allah or Jesus? (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2016), 60.
Khattab, The Clear Quran, 42:51.
Charles Taliaferro and Elsa J Marty, A Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion (New York: Continuum, 2010), 120.
Qureshi, No God but One, 62.
Ergun Mehmet Caner and Emir Fethi Caner, Unveiling Islam, 2nd edition (2002; repr., Grand Rapids, Michigan: Kregel Publications, 2009), 117.
Qureshi, No God but One, 60-61.
Ibid., 62.
Norman L Geisler and Abdul Saleeb, Answering Islam: The Crescent in Light of the Cross (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 2002), 29-30.
Ibid., 138.
Qureshi, No God but One, 62.
Geisler and Saleeb, Answering Islam, 273.
Ibid., 277.
Westminster Shorter Catechism, Q. 1.
Caner and Caner, Unveiling Islam, 118.
Qureshi, No God but One, 62.
Caner and Caner, Unveiling Islam, 117-118.
Ibid., 117-118.
John 1:14 ESV
Philippians 2:7-8
Schaff and Schaff, History of the Christian Church, 602.